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1 ABBREVIATIONS 
AB   Swedish limited liability company (Aktiebiolag) 
AG    Austrian public limited liability company (Aktiengesellschaft) 
AG  Advocate General 
AktG    Austrian Corporate Law for public limited liability company  
BMF  Austrian Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium für Finanzen) 
CA   The Companies Act  
CTA    Corporation Taxes Act 
ECJ  Court of Justice of the European Union (in European literature often 
abbreviated to CJEU) 
EStG   Austrian Income Taxes Act (Einkommenssteuergesetz) 
EU   European Union 
EVL   Finnish Act on Business Taxation (Elinkeinoverolaki) 
FSMA 2000  Financial Service and Markets Acts 2000 
GAAR  General Anti-Abuse Rules 
GmbH  Austrian private limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung) 
GmbHG  Austrian Corporate Law for private limited liability company 
HMRC  Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (UK) 
IBFD   International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation  
ICTA   UK Income and Corporations Taxes Act 
KStG    Austrian Corporation Taxes Act (Körperschaftssteuergesetz) 
LIR   Luxembourg Tax Rules (Loi de l’impôt sur le revenue) 
LSC  Luxembourg law on commercial companies (loi sur les societies 
commerciales) 
MS  Member State 
PE  Permanent Establishment 
SA   Luxembourg public limited liability company (Société Anonyme) 
SarL  Luxembourg private limited liability company (Société a responsabilité 
limitée) 
SCA  Luxembourg Partnership limited by shares (Société en commandite par 
actions) 
StAnpG  Austrian Adjustment Taxes Act (Steueranpassungsgesetz) 
StrukAnpG  Austrian Infrastructure Adjustment Taxes Act 
(Strukturanpassungsgesetz) 
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TAAR  Targeted Anti-Abuse Rules 
TCGA  UK Taxation of Capital Gains Act 
TFEU  Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union 
TIOPA  UK Taxation (International and other Provisions) Act 
TVL   Finnish Income Tax Act (Tuloverolaki)  
UGB   Austrian Corporate Law (Unternehmensgesetzbuch) 
UK    United Kingdom 
UmgrStG  Austrian Corporate Restructuring Taxes Act 
(Umgründungssteuergesetz) 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Background 
Corporate groups consist of a number of companies that are often independent legal 
entities, however despite this legal separation, in economic reality part of one unit. 
Each entity may be subject to separate corporate and tax rules in its country of 
incorporation. Optimizing the corporate legal entity structure by terminating loss-
making activities and combining entities can achieve increased profitability and 
realize cost savings.  
 
For domestic reorganizations, most jurisdictions provide favorable national treatment 
for groups of companies, by providing for tax neutral legal entity restructurings within 
a group. Crossborder reorganizations across multiple jurisdictions and tax systems are 
more complex and do not tend to award the same benefits for group mergers. They 
often result in unused losses or increased tax liabilities. In addition to the often 
lacking domestic rules for cross border mergers, these transactions are also often 
subject to European Union (“EU”) law. EU law does not explicitly harmonize direct 
Taxation, so the case law of the ECJ provides guidance in its judgments. The resulting 
uncertainty for corporates as to whether losses can be ‘merged’ makes decisions on 
legal entity restructurings difficult and may limit the ability to choose the most 
efficient corporate structure.  
 
2.2 Aim and delimitations 
The aim in this paper is to establish to what extent rules in domestic tax law provide 
for tax neutrality in mergers and whether they allow for internal and cross border loss 
set off. In this paper, an overview of the relevant rules for domestic and European 
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group mergers in three European countries - Austria, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg and the United Kingdom – will be given, drawing out similarities and 
potential problematic areas. All three jurisdictions allow tax neutral restructurings of 
some kind, which raises the question as to what extent losses can be ‘mergable’.  
 
ECJ case law is analysed with the aim to furthermore establish whether the ‘final 
losses doctrine’ and ‘valid commercial rationale’ discussion by the ECJ has been 
shaping the national laws on loss utilisation in Austria, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom. In the analysis of the case law, a natural area of focus will be on the recent 
emphasis for loss availability in a crossborder merger - the concepts of when losses 
are ‘final losses’ and when a restructuring is undertaken for a ‘valid commercial 
rationale‘. These are important concepts in the ECJ’s jurisprudence as they ensure 
losses can no longer be used in the other Member State and no abuse is suspected, in 
which case an exceptional requirement for the host state to take losses into 
consideration exists. 
 
The analysis is limited to the merger in groups of companies and their subsidiaries in 
the EU; rules on group consolidations and distributions will not be considered. The 
ECJ case law analysis will focus on cases with regard to final losses of subsidiaries, 
discussions of on-going losses or cases regarding foreign PEs will only be taken into 
consideration where they add an important aspect to the discussion. 
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2.3 Structure of Paper 
Chapter 3 will review the three respective domestic corporate law framework for 
mergers, explore their definition of merger and give an overview of the national tax 
rules, including the approach to anti-abuse rules. The chapter ends with an overview 
of common themes and potential problems. 
 
Chapter 4 gives an introduction to applicable EU laws, their mechanics and the 
fundamental freedoms. After an overview of the procedure of referring cases to the 
ECJ, it gives a summary of the increased role of the ECJ in defining the boundaries 
for harmonisation in the area of direct taxation in the EU. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses how the line of ECJ case law on loss utilisation and anti-abuse 
scenarios has developed. The review here focuses on the ECJ judgement in Marks & 
Spencer and A Oy in the areas of loss utilisation and Foggia as an example of anti-
abuse discussion as they constitute the most recent and most relevant decisions. The 
chapter concludes with summarising the requirements for cross-border loss utilisation 
in a group merger and potential open questions. 
 
Chapter 6 contains a conclusion for the whole thesis by answering the questions 
raised at the outset and pointing to current developments.  
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3 DOMESTIC FRAMEWORKS FOR MERGERS 
3.1 Introduction 
To understand the different tax rules for mergers, a starting point will be the different 
concepts in the national corporate law of the three countries. For the purposes for this 
paper, the term ‘merger’ will be used to describe what is generally considered a legal 
merger1. Essentially where a corporation (the transferring entity) is legally merged 
with another corporation (the receiving entity), the transferring entity’s assets and 
liabilities are taken over by the receiving entity and the transferring entity then ceases 
to exist without going into liquidation.2  
 
One of the main challenges with this topic is that the definition of merger and its 
subsequent tax treatment depend entirely on the respective jurisdiction’s corporate 
law. Each of the jurisdictions has its own definition of merger. The corporate law in 
both Austria and Luxembourg provides specifically for a merger by absorption3, the 
UK however does not.  
 
3.2 Corporate Laws on mergers 
In Austria, corporates are subject to the general rules of the Unternehmensgesetz 
(“UGB”), which are then supplemented by specific rules depending on the type of 
corporation. For private limited companies (GmbHs), and public limited companies 
                                                 
 
1
 This understanding is in line with the definition of merger in Art.2 of the Merger Directive (Directive 90/434/EEC 
on a common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning 
companies of different Member States). 
 
2
 Also see the European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”) decision in Punch Graphix (C-371/11), which confirmed that the 
dissolution of a company through a merger by acquisition cannot be equated to a liquidation. 
 
3
 In both countries, this in addition to a merger by incorporation, which is also explicitly stipulated in the corporate 
and tax laws. 
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(AG)4 the rules on mergers by absorption (“Verschmelzung durch Aufnahme”) are in 
§ 96, Abs.1 GmbHG5 and § 219, Abs 1 AktG6. As a result of these rules, a merger by 
absorption leads to universal succession (‘Gesamtrechtsnachfolge’) by operation of 
law in exchange for shares, i.e. a full assignment of all assets, rights and liabilities 
from the transferring company to the receiving company. 
 
In Luxembourg, the loi sur les sociétés commerciales 7  (law on commercial 
companies, “LSC”) governs the legal aspects of domestic and cross border mergers 
for corporates8 (Section XIV – Des Fusions9). A merger by absorption is defined as 
“an operation whereby one or more companies, dissolved but not liquidated, pass on 
all of their net assets (assets and liabilities included) to an existing or new company. 
Their contributions are remunerated by the allocation of shares in the pre-existing or 
new company and, where applicable, the payment of a balancing cash adjustment that 
does not exceed 10 % of the nominal value of the units or shares distributed.” 10 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Applicable corporate and tax laws are driven by the legal form and seat (administrative centre, “Verwaltungssitz” - 
as per § 10 Bundesgesetz vom 15. Juni 1978 über das internationale Privatrecht (“IPR-Gesetz”), this will in most cases be the 
same as the place of effective management (“Ort der Geschäftsleitung”), which governs the jurisdiction to tax under § 27, Abs 2 
Bundesabgabenordnung (“BAO”). See http://www.jusline.at/27_BAO.html on 20.5.2013.) of the company in question (See 
Steuerrichtlinien: Rz 28-30 UmgrStR. See https://findok.bmf.gv.at/findok/link?gz=%22BMF-010203%2F0560-
VI%2F6%2F2011%22&gueltig=20111115&bereich=rl on 20.5.2013.) 
 
5
 “Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung können unter Ausschluß der Abwicklung verschmolzen werden. Die 
Verschmelzung kann erfolgen durch Übertragung des Vermögens einer Gesellschaft oder mehrerer Gesellschaften (übertragende 
Gesellschaften) im Wege der Gesamtrechtsnachfolge auf eine andere bestehende Gesellschaft (übernehmende Gesellschaft) 
gegen Gewährung von Geschäftsanteilen dieser Gesellschaft (Verschmelzung durch Aufnahme) […]” at 
http://www.jusline.at/96_Begriff_der_Verschmelzung_GmbHG.html on 10.8.2013. 
 
6
 “Aktiengesellschaften können unter Ausschluß der Abwicklung verschmolzen werden. Die Verschmelzung kann 
erfolgen durch Übertragung des Vermögens einer Gesellschaft oder mehrerer Gesellschaften (übertragende Gesellschaften) im 
Weg der Gesamtrechtsnachfolge auf eine andere bestehende Gesellschaft (übernehmende Gesellschaft) gegen Gewährung von 
Aktien dieser Gesellschaft (Verschmelzung durch Aufnahme) […]” at 
http://www.jusline.at/219_Begriff_der_Verschmelzung_AktG.html on 10.8.2013. 
 
7
 Initially dating from 10 August 1915 and as amended in 2011. 
 
8
 The corporate law applies to a range of commercial companies, including the S.A., S.a.r.L.and the SCA. All these 
companies limited by shares are also subject to corporate income tax. 
 
9
 See http://eli.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/1915/08/10/n1 on 10.8.2013. 
 
10
 See http://www.guichet.public.lu/entreprises/en/fiscalite/developpement-restructuration/acquisition-
societes/fusion/index.html, on 14.5.2013. 
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In the UK, a very different approach is taken. Company law does not specifically 
provide for a ‘statutory’ merger or merger by fusion. Instead, a business combination 
can be achieved through a share exchange 11  combined with a subsequent group 
reorganization or by transferring the business to the receiving company in exchange 
for shares in that company (Scheme of reconstruction). These transactions do not 
automatically result in only one surviving company 12  and therefore require a 
subsequent liquidation of the transferring company.  
 
Having three different corporate law approaches to the legal construct available for 
business reorganization, helps to understand the different national tax rules for 
mergers. 
 
3.3 Tax Laws on mergers 
3.3.1 Austria 
In Austria, the process of legally and commercially combining the assets and 
liabilities of the transferring company and the receiving company is termed 
‘Verschmelzung’ (amalgamation). In general, all transactions are subject to the main 
principle of Austrian taxation, the ‘Tauschgrundsatz’ § 6 Z 14 
Einkommenssteuergesetz (“EStG”), whereby all exchanges should be valued at the 
common value of the asset. Austrian tax law, jurisprudence and case law differentiate 
                                                 
 
11
 See Harris (2013), p.542.  
 
12
 The only form of universal succession in UK company law is achieved through schemes of arrangement, 
Companies Act 2006, Parts 26 and 27 (ss. 895-941). Also see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/insmanual/ins3101.htm, on 
16.5.2013. These are available either formally under both The Companies Act (Section 425 CA 1985 for preserving the business 
of a company to be carried on by substantially the same persons) and the Insolvency Act (Sections 110, 167 to 169 IA 1986 for 
companies in liquidation whose business is transferred to another company) or as informal schemes. They will result in the 
liquidation of the ceasing company post transfer of all or part of the undertaking. As the formal requirements are rather 
cumbersome, schemes of arrangements are seldom used. 
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combining entities, whilst maintaining essential business activities13, from a disposal 
of assets and liabilities. As a result, mergers of private and public limited companies 
are governed by the specific - and mandatory 14  – rules of § 1 Abs 1 Z 1 
Umgründungssteuergesetz15 (“UmgrStG”)16.  
 
Tax neutrality is achieved by valuing the transferred assets and liabilities at their 
historic cost base in the receiving company (“Buchwertfortführung”). Consequently, 
unrealised gains and losses (“stille Reserven”, “stille Lasten”) are only triggered at a 
subsequent revaluation 17  or disposal, provided the jurisdiction’s ability to tax 
subsequent gains is not diminished. These rules are limited by § 24 Abs 2 UmgrStG 
to a scenario where the ‘jurisdiction to tax’ is changing and a potential reduction of 
the Austrian tax base would occur. 
 
The most significant exceptions to achieving tax neutrality occur in cases of abuse. 
Where substance and legal form differ, economic substance18 is taken as the basis for 
calculating the tax liability. Where the sole motivation of a transaction is found to be 
                                                 
 
13
 This applies as long as the merger is indeed a reorganisation of business activities and assets under a new legal form 
and ownership. See later discussion of cases of abuse.  
 
14
 § 1 Abs 3 UmgrStG. The UmgrStG applies mandatorily but also exclusively to all cases of amalgamation with no 
ability to choose other, more general, tax rules. See Doralt/Ruppe I8  pp.382 et seq. 
 
15
 Applicable to mergers after 31.12.1991 (BGBl 1991/699). Prior to that the Strukturverbesserungsgesetz (BGBl 
1969/69) allowed adjusting the legal form for commercially required reorganizations whilst avoiding the realization of profits as 
would have been triggered in a sale. 
 
16
 See § 20 Abs1 KStG, rather than applying the liquidation rules under § 19 Körperschaftssteuergesetz (“KStG”). 
 
17
 Under Austrian accounting rules (§ 202 Abs 2 Unternehmensgesetzbuch (“UGB”) (2013), amalgamations result in 
a) a choice whether to continue the cost base of the assets or apply current value, and b) in case of a continuation of the cost base, 
a limitation of backdating the merger by a maximum of 9 months prior to registration with the companies register 
(“Firmenbuch”). See Doralt/Ruppe I8 pp.385 et seq. Where the UmgrStG applies, the “Massgeblichkeitsprinzip”, a rule under 
which accounting results have to be carried into the tax accounts, does not apply and the tax accounts may diverge from the 
financial accounts. For a merger, final accounts of the ceasing company need to be prepared (“Schlussbilanz”) as well as 
combined accounts of the two companies after the merger (“Verschmelzungsbilanz”). The rules of the UmgrStG apply 
irrespective of whether there is an election to mark to market under the accounting rules. 
 
18
 See Rosenberger, Stürzlinger (2011), p.111 and § 21 Abs.1 BAO.  
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the reduction or elimination of a tax obligation 19 , § 44 UmgrStG negates the 
application of the UmgrStG for both domestic and cross border transactions. Cross 
border mergers are tested for abuse under the anti-abuse articles of the Merger 
Directive20. In both cases the benefits of the UmgrStG are no longer available and the 
liquidation rules of § 20 iVm § 19 KStG 1988 apply, resulting in the realization of 
unrealized gains and losses.  
 
In Austria, losses incurred by resident companies are generally available for 
indefinite21 carry forward22 (§ 18 Abs. 6 & 7 EStG 1988). For both domestic and 
cross border EU mergers, § 4 UmgrStG23 provides that unutilised losses connected 
with either of the companies be transferred to the receiving company. They are 
subsequently available for future set off against profits as long as the assets relating to 
the losses are still in existence on the merger date (“objektbezogener 
Verlustvortrag”)24.  
 
The loss carry forward is limited by § 8 Abs 4 Z 2 KStG25 in cases of trading loss 
companies (a circumstance considered abusive and termed ‘Mantelkauf’ 26 ). The 
                                                 
 
19
 As per the Austrian General Anti-Abuse Rule (‘GAAR’) of § 22 BAO. For a recent analysis see Kofler, Austria in 
IFA (ed.), Tax treaties and tax avoidance: application of anti-avoidance provisions, vol 95a, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 
pp.100 et seq. (2010) 
 
20
 Art. 15 of the EU Directive 2009/133/EG. 
 
21
 As introduced by the Strukturanpassungsgesetz 1996 (“StrukAnpG”). 
 
22
 No provisions for loss carry back exist under Austrian tax law. See Achatz, p.294. 
 
23
 Carrying forward the losses requires a) accounting for assets and liabilities at historic cost (§ 4 Z 1 lit a UmgrStG), 
b) assets relevant to losses being in existence at merger date (§ 4 Z 1 lit a UmgrStG), c) assets being transferred is comparable to 
assets at time of incurring losses (§ 4 Z 1 lit c UmgrStG), d) no limited for connected companies (§ 4 Z 1 lit d UmgrStG) and e) 
not abuse (‘Mantelkauf’ § 4 Z 2 UmgrStG). 
 
24The requirement for transferred assets and liabilities to be connected with the losses is similar to the requirement of 
Article 4 (2) Merger Directive.  See § 4 Abs Z lit d UmgrStG for rules regarding previous revaluations of group equity holdings. 
 
25
 See Achatz p.299 et seq. for more background. 
 
26
 See also SWK Heft-Nr 9/1995, 249 and SWK Heft-Nr 9/1996, 191. As the rules on ‘Mantelkaufgeschäfte’ are 
ambiguous, there are numerous discussion and cases on this topic debating what constitutes a continuation of comparable 
business assets and activities, for example SWK Heft-Nr 23/2003, 580 Norbert Schrottmeyer: Umgründungssteuerrecht: Ein Fall 
aus der Praxis - Mantelkauf und Verschmelzungen, Zusammenspiel von § 8 Abs 4 Z 2 KStG und § 4 UmgrStG. 
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circumstances of a ‘Mantelkauf’ transaction are suspected in cases of significantly 
changing a) the character of the business in a merger situation, b) substantial changes 
to the organizational structure and c) to the business scope of the company. As these 
facts would leave the business considerably changed they result in the non-
transferability of the losses in a sale.27  
 
3.3.2 Luxembourg  
In Luxembourg, specific tax rules cover legal entity restructurings including the 
combination of two entities through a merger by absorption. The rules of Art. 169-
172bis Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu (“LIR”) provide for the universal transfer of the 
net assets 28  of the transferring entity to the receiving entity, the automatic 
dissolution 29  of the transferring entity and the remuneration for the transferring 
entity’s contributions. Roll over relief is provided for both domestic and cross border 
mergers. The benefit of tax neutral mergers are only available where the receiving a) 
company is a fully taxable Luxembourg resident taxpayer30, b) the remuneration31 is 
limited to a small cash portion32 / exchange for shares and c) the receiving company 
continues to account33 for assets and liabilities at historic cost base34 to ensure any 
hidden reserves stemming from unrealised gains and losses will be taxed in the future. 
 
                                                 
 
27
 More on the likely circumstances constituting a ‘Mantelkauf’ in Petritz, Ressler p.193 et seq. 
 
28
 Termed ‘transmission universelle de patrimoine’ and governed by art.171 al.I LIR, at 
http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/legislation/LIR/Loi_modifi__e_du_4_d__cembre_1967_concernant_l_imp__t_sur_le_revenu
_-_texte_coordonn___au_1er_janvier_20131.pdf on 14.5.2013. 
 
29
 See art.170 al.Ier LIR. 
 
30
 Art.170 al.2 LIR. 
 
31
 Art.170 al. 2 no I LIR. A merger premium can be calculated by comparing the value of the net assets (‘la valeur 
nette comptable de l’actif social transféré’) to the total remuneration obtained (‘la rémunération obtenue pour l’actif social’), see 
Steichen (2004) pp. 446 et seq. 
 
32
 Not exceeding 10% of the nominal value of shares. 
 
33
 Art.170 al.4 LIR. 
 
34
 See also Steichen (2004) pp.446 et seq. 
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Tax-neutral mergers are possible for domestic or EU reorganisation if Luxembourg 
retains the right to tax any deferred gains at the time of realisation35, usually implying 
some presence, i.e. a permanent establishment, remaining onshore in an outward 
merger. Where the receiving entity held a participating interest of 10% or more in the 
transferring entity, Luxembourg applies a preferential regime. The benefit provided 
from the Parent Subsidiary directive is extended to the capital gain from the share 
exchange and is treated as if it had been a dividend. 36 
 
Only the entity that suffered the losses can carry them forward. Art.114 LIR provides 
that Luxembourg resident companies can carry forward losses without time limits and 
offset them against future profits, subject to certain conditions37. In a merger, this 
means that the receiving entity cannot carry forward any losses incurred by the 
transferring company 38 . By contrast, the same does not apply to a change in 
shareholder39. In cases of suspected abuse, the tax authorities can refuse the carry 
forward of the losses and re-characterise 40  a transaction under § 6 
                                                 
 
35
 “L’article 170bis LIR nouvellement introduit en 2001 traite des opérations de fusion […..] , impliquerait qu’il y 
aurait obligation que le bénéfice reste exposé à une imposition ultérieure au Luxembourg.” Winandy, (2003) p.12. 
 
36 Art.171 Al.3 LIR. See http://www.guichet.public.lu/entreprises/en/fiscalite/developpement-
restructuration/acquisition-societes/fusion/index.html#undefined! on 10.8.2013. 
 
37
 The conditions of indefinite loss carry forward und Art. 114 LIR are - the losses have not already been offset, - the 
company has maintained proper accounting during the loss making period and, - the losses are off-set by the company that 
incurred them.  
 
38
 See Beltjens, p.436 regarding the options for fiscal unity utilization of losses for group companies. In addition, 
where the entity might have unrealized gains on assets, it could sell these to the receiving entity just before the merger and – as 
all transactions in Luxembourg are required to be conducted at arms length – realize the gain which could then be set off against 
its existing losses, see Beltjens p.438. 
 
39
 The ability to continue using losses following a change in shareholder rather than a merger has been confirmed in 
2010 by the Administrative Court of Luxembourg (CAA, 15 July 2010, no.25957c) which upheld a decision by the 
Administrative Tribunal (TA, 6 July 2009, no.23982) confirming that tax losses can not be carried over if the company has been 
solely bought for exploiting pre-existing tax losses . An administrative circular (Circular no. 114/2 LIR of 2 Sept 2010) 
confirmed the right to carry forward losses in case of changing shareholder as long as economic activities are continued or even 
extended. 
 
40
 Transactions are analyzed based on their substance, rather than their chosen legal form, where there might be a 
divergence between the two. See IFA Cahiers 2011, vol.96a p. 476 referring to IFA Cahiers 2010, vol. 95a p.490. 
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Steueranpassungsgesetz (“StAnpG”)41. The ‘Mantelkauf’ theory is also applied in 
Luxembourg where the authorities suspect a new shareholder has simply bought an 
empty shell company with losses. 
3.3.3 United Kingdom 
A company will be subject to tax in the United Kingdom (“UK”), if it is resident42 
there. Tax is levied on the company’s profits, which consist of its income and 
chargeable gains (i.e. the capital gains). This differentiation also drives the different 
sources of UK tax law most relevant to corporate restructurings - the Corporation 
Taxes Act (2009) (CTA 2009) and the Taxation of Capital Gains Act 1992 (TCGA 
1992).43  
 
As established, the UK has no codified rules in corporate law for legal entity 
restructurings; hence the taxpayer must look to a number of provisions in tax law to 
understand the potential impact of a group merger. The Taxation of Capital Gains Act 
(TCGA) 1992 s.139 allows for the transfer of a business, or part of a business, from 
one company to another under a scheme of reconstruction at a tax value that results in 
neither a gain nor a loss.44  
Merger relief45, a roll over deferral for Capital Gains Tax, is available for a merger by 
share exchange as long as certain holding thresholds46 are met. Internal transfers of 
                                                 
 
41
 In addition to the general tax provision of the Abgabenordnung (“AO”) dealing with procedural aspects of direct 
taxes, the StAnpG sets out particular principles of tax law. See Steichen (2013) pp.2 et seq. 
 
42
 The UK’s residency rules are twofold, either by the company being incorporated in the UK or by having it central 
management and control in the UK if it is incorporated elsewhere. 
 
43
 Tax liabilities arising after the restructuring might be covered by Taxation (International and other Provisions) Act 
2010 (TIOPA 2010) and Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (ICTA 1988). 
 
44See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/ctm47410.htm on 15.5.2013. If the conditions are met, then the 
provision applies mandatory unless the main purpose is the avoidance of tax. If the assets are transferred in exchange for shares 
followed by liquidation, again a tax deferral is available until the ultimate sale of the assets under TCGA 1992 s. 140. 
 
45
 See Harris (2013), p.538. Also see IBFD (2003), p.29 “The tax legislation of the UK does not contain a provision 
providing for rollover relief for assets and liabilities transferred in the case of a merger by acquisition of a company resident in 
the United Kingdom and a company resident in another Member State.”  
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assets within a capital gains group can also be achieved under the group relief rules 
resulting in the ‘porting’ of the historic book cost and any capital gain only being 
realized upon sale outside of the group as long as no exit from the UK tax system 
occurs.47 
 
Losses can not only be offset within the group, but also carried back or carried 
forward. A company can carry most losses forward with no time limitations, subject 
to a ‘quality’ limitation resulting from the UK schedular system of taxation - losses 
can only be offset against future profits of the same trade48 by the same legal entity.  
 
Recently, a GAAR rule has been introduced in the UK49, which might significantly 
change the current position. To date no substance over form doctrine was enshrined in 
domestic legislation and only a range of targeted provisions (“TAAR”) and case law 
had developed a system where transactions could be recharacterised if found to be 
solely structured to obtain a tax advantage.50 In general, genuine and commercially 
                                                                                                                                           
 
46
 See Harris (2013), pp.542 et seq. Scenarios allowing for merger relief are a) the receiving entity holds in excess of 
25% or ordinary share capital of the transferring entity, b) the receiving entity made a general offer to the shareholders of the 
transferring entity and c) post merger, the receiving entity holds ‘the greater part of the voting power’ in the transferring entity. 
See TCGA 1992 s.135 and 137, s.138 for clearance procedure available. However see Harris (2013), pp.547 et seq for the 
potential issues in valuing the shares and assets appropriately. 
 
47
 See TCGA 1992, s.171 allowing transfers between UK tax resident members of the capital gains group on a no 
gain/no loss basis and entitles the receiving entity to inherit the historic acquisition cost of the asset. There is an ongoing 
discussion whether the rules in s.171 conform with EU law due following the ECJ’s decision in X and Y v Riksskatteverket (C-
436/00). 
 
48
 CTA 2010, s.45 (1)-(6). See Green, Newby, Sarson (2011) p.737 for a review of circumstances and case law where 
losses cease to be available. 
 
49
 On 17th July 2013, the Finance Bill 2013 received Royal Ascent to become the Finance Act 2013 and introduced a 
GAAR into UK legislation. HMRC in its guidance note however make it very clear that its intention is to ‘change the game’ and 
deter taxpayers from entering into abusive arrangements, the guidance paper states as the fundamental approach “It [the GAAR] 
therefore rejects the approach taken by the Courts in a number of old cases to the effect that taxpayers are free to use their 
ingenuity to reduce their tax bills by any lawful means, however contrived those means might be and however far the tax 
consequences might diverge from the real economic position.” It is yet unproven how such this will influence what are perceived 
to be abusive arrangements and profit shifting activities and upcoming decisions by the courts. 
 
50
 See line of argument from Duke of Westminster v CIR [1936] AC1 where the court refused to look a substance over 
form but respected the legal form chosen and its tax results (“Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the 
appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however 
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow tax payers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to 
pay an increased tax.”, Lord Tomlin) to Lord Wilberforce introducing the concept of ‘circular’ schemes of tax avoidance in W T 
Ramsay Ltd v IRC ([1981] STC 174) and establishing the ‘Ramsay principle’. The Ramsay principle got extended beyond 
circular transactions to a scheme of tax deferral in Furniss v Dawson ([1984] STC 153). 
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motivated cases of business restructuring should not be considered artificial. Anti-
abuse provisions under TCGA 1992 s.137 mean that merger relief is not available if 
the transaction forms part of a so-called ‘scheme’ and one of its main purposes is to 
avoid tax51. Specific anti-abuse provisions are included in the corporation tax rules to 
prevent the utilization of losses incurred by an unconnected company, eliminating 
certain cases of trading in loss companies.52 
 
3.4 Common Themes and Potential Problems 
The amalgamation of two corporations into one corporation is governed by different 
rules in each of the three countries, both under corporate and tax law. Where these 
rules foresee a legal merger scenario, one expects to see a coherent system and 
symmetry in the tax treatment.  
 
Merging two companies and achieving tax neutrality in a domestic scenario can be 
achieved in all three jurisdictions, albeit through different mechanisms. In Austria and 
Luxembourg, corporate law recognizes the concept of a legal merger and tax rules 
allow tax neutrality for assets and liabilities under certain conditions where the 
merged company ceases to exist. By contrast, in the UK a business combination 
requires more complicated arrangements. Corporate law does not foresee a special 
procedure for a merger and hence the tax treatment depends on which surrogate is 
chosen. Roll over relief in Austria and Luxembourg for mergers and in the UK for 
                                                 
 
51
 See HMRC Manual CG 52670, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cgmanual/cg52670.htm on 20.5.2013. HMRC as 
executive authority does neither write law nor does it generally issue binding rulings. Their current view can be deducted from 
publicly available HMRC manuals and handbooks and will give guidance as to interpretational freedom of the law. “As well as 
the legislation contained in the taxes Act and statutory instrument, the UK government also issues statements of practice (SPs) 
and extra-statutory concessions (ESCs), outlining the approach of HM revenue and Customs (HMRC) in relation to unclear or 
complex areas of legislation.” See Green, Newby and Sarson, p.731. 
 
52
 CTA 2010, s.719 (2), (3), CTA 2010, s.673 (1)-(3) and HMRC Statement of Practice 10/91. Broadly, these require 
the original trade to be continued, losses to the original trade to be ring fenced as well as continuity in the ownership of the trade. 
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share exchanges is provided as long as the jurisdiction maintains the ability to tax any 
latent gains at a future point in time.  
Over and beyond the transfer of assets at historic cost, the availability of losses 
becomes the most interesting subject for discussion. Looking at the wider context in 
the EU, only three countries (Denmark, Italy and Austria) allow crossborder offset of 
profit and losses53. Nine EU members have no concept of group taxation and the 
remaining have a more or less generous concept of offsetting losses and profits like 
the UK and Luxembourg when taxing each entity separately under the concept of 
legal personality that are not in principle consolidated.  
 
Austrian companies have the most generous tax group regime under § 9 KStG where 
even foreign losses can be offset. In Luxembourg, a tax consolidation regime allows 
for the offsetting of losses with profits within the same group as long as the parent 
company is fully taxable in Luxembourg and holds at least 95% of the share capital of 
its fully taxable Luxembourg consolidated subsidiaries54. Austria and Luxembourg 
have “change of ownership” rules to limit the amount of losses transferred and trigger 
forfeiture if the subsidiaries losses in upon significant change in business activities or 
ownership. The UK has no system of group consolidation55, it does however allow 
certain current year losses incurred by one company to be set off against the profits of 
                                                 
 
53
 See BMF, p.19. A recent report by the Federal Audit office (‘Bundesrechnungshof’) has highlighted that the 
generous crossborder group taxation regime resulted in EUR 3bn of foreign losses being offset in Austria and EUR 0.5bn foreign 
loss carry forwards being claimed against Austrian income. As Austria does not have any ability to tax foreign income, it is 
questionable whether any other countries would want to follow the example of the extended cross border tax grouping at such a 
high cost. The counter argument, and the argument the Ministry of Finance is putting forward, is that the generous group taxation 
rules in Austria have resulted in increased number of multinational companies relocating their headquarters and hence additional 
tax revenues. As no exact numbers are available this will remain an area for debate and political decisions. 
 
54 Art. 164 LIR, this tax consolidation only covers corporate and commercial income tax. Also see 
http://www.guichet.public.lu/entreprises/en/fiscalite/developpement-restructuration/acquisition-
societes/fusion/index.html#undefined! on 10.8.2013. 
 
55
 Each company is required to compute their profits and tax liability on a single entity basis. 
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a group company under certain conditions, known as group relief.56 Members of a 
75% owned group are able to offset trading losses 57  against profits in group 
companies in the same period avoiding the disadvantage of establishing group 
companies compared to setting up branches, which are automatically consolidated.58 
 
In crossborder settings, the ability to use losses of merged companies is often 
restricted. Losses can become ‘stranded’ in a country where they are inaccessible and 
no access to relief in the taxpayer’s state of residence. This may put companies in an 
unfavourable position compared to a mere domestic setting by resulting in a total tax 
burden exceeding the actual profits and its economic capacity59 to pay taxes. The 
shortcoming in domestic legislation only relieving losses form the state of origin 
constitutes a barrier to accessing other markets. As such these do not conform to the 
guiding principle of the European Union – the establishment of a functioning internal 
market.  
 
At the same time, provisions too generous can also contravene EU law. The domestic 
rules allow for the Austrian parent to utilize foreign losses in the period in which they 
are incurred, if they cannot be offset abroad. Such loss utilization is subject to a claw 
back, if the losses can be used in the foreign state in the future then Austria retains the 
right to ‘make up’ payments. The ECJ’s case law has shown in its decisions on final 
                                                 
 
56
 Also see Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey (December 2005) for a successful challenge to the group relief rules and 
the subsequent extension of domestic group relief rules in 2006. A UK case, Electronics v Inspector of Taxes [2005] S.T.C. 
(S.C.D.) 512, discusses the issue of setting of terminal losses of two of its divisions against prior year profits, testing the question 
whether these where separate trades. Also, cross border loss surrender is not possible where the loss to be surrendered has been 
partially deducted from the non-residents tax liability, see Philips Electronics (C-18/11). 
 
57
 Trading losses, excess capital allowances and non-trading deficits on loan relationships may be surrendered in full, 
irrespectively of whether the transferring company has other profits, which might have been offset. See 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/CTM80110.htm on 10.8.2013. 
 
58
 See ICTA88/S403 (1), (2) and (3).  The group relief rules are different for income and capital gains tax and some 
important limitations apply, in particular re capital losses. 
 
59
 See also Cohrs (2013). 
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losses that it does not consider the Austrian loss utilization rules in § 9 Abs.6 Z6 
KStG compliant with EU law.  
 
 
4 EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MERGERS 
4.1 EU Law 
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)60 national 
rules must comply with EU law to support the internal market. EU Directives provide 
a framework and the desired outcome but leave form and method of achieving these 
to the member state. 
In tax law, generally only indirect taxes are harmonized61 as they impact the free 
movement of goods and the freedom to provide services. Direct tax laws remain the 
sole responsibility of the Member State62, a reserved but not unlimited competence, 
which only applies within the boundaries set by EU law63. National rules create a 
restriction, when they implement measures that “[…] prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the exercise of that freedom”64. The TFEU articles concerning the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital (the four ‘fundamental freedoms’)65 
have direct effect for national law. The questions referred to the ECJ ordinarily 
                                                 
 
60
 C 83/51 as updated in 2010, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF on 11.8.2013. 
 
61
 Under Art. 113 TFEU “The Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure 
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, adopt provisions for the harmonisation 
of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation 
is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition.“ See 
also Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital and Council Directive 
2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended over time. 
 
62
 In the absence of a specific provisions, Art. 115 TFEU is seen to be the most appropriate legal basis for possible EU 
wide harmonization in the area of direct tax. 
 
63
 See AG Maduro’s opinion on Mark & Spencer at para.  4 for the role of the ECJ and the statement of the ECJ in its 
Schumacher (C-279/93) judgement at para. 21. 
 
64
 See AG Maduro’s opinion on Mark & Spencer at para. 35. 
 
65
 The fundamental freedoms are: 1.Free movement of workers Art. 45 TFEU, 2. Freedom of establishment Art. 49-55 
TFEU, 3. Freedom to provide services Art. 56 TFEU, and 4. Free movement of capital Art. 63 TFEU. 
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concern discussions whether a restriction imposed by the Member State engaged any 
of the fundamental freedoms. Following an array of case law66, it is now a generally 
accepted doctrine of Community Law that cross-border mergers in Europe 67  are 
protected by the fundamental freedom of establishment68. Alternatively to switching 
on the fundamental freedoms, group mergers across jurisdictions also might fall under 
the Merger Directive and invoke EU law through that route. 
 
As established earlier in this paper, domestic tax rules often lack with respect to 
crossborder mergers. This creates uncertainty and leads to cross border 
reorganizations being frequently discussed in the European courts and referred to the 
ECJ. In the functioning internal market, a company should have the choice as to 
whether it incorporates a subsidiary domestically or in another member state. When 
merging a subsidiary69, often it will be in a loss making position or have historic 
losses and hence be considered for closure. The ability to use such losses is critical to 
the surviving group companies. 
 
 
                                                 
 
66
 See Cohrs 2013 for a formidable review of the case law.  
 
67
 See Mindpearl AG v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 555 (TC) for a decision, where a Swiss company which had claimed 
loss relief under the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 s.343 based on the trading losses of its predecessor could not argue 
that the 75 per cent requirement under s.343(1)(a) was contrary to EC Treaty (Nice) art.43, now Article 49 TFEU, as that 
provision only applied to transactions between nationals of Member States. 
 
68
 Under Art. 49 TFEU, as extended to companies by Art. 54 TFEU. See discussion in Chapter 5 for analysis of recent 
case law. 
 
69
 This also applies to the establishment of a domestic branch versus a cross border Permanent Establishment. For 
relevant case laws see Deutsche Shell  GmbH v. Finanzamt für Grossunternehmen in Hamburg (C-293/06) and Krankenheim 
Ruhesitz (C-157/07) which both concerns final losses of a foreign PE, whereas Lidl Belgium (C-414/06) concerns ongoing losses 
of PE. 
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4.2 The Merger Directive 
National Rules on group restructurings have been shaped by the Merger Directive70, 
which aims71 to abolish tax obstacles on cross-border reorganisations.  The scope72 of 
the Merger Directive is very prescriptive – it applies to cross border mergers between 
companies resident in European Union member states 73  (“Member States”). The 
Merger Directive allows the merger of business operations without triggering 
immediate capital gains tax and puts cross border mergers on an equal footing to most 
domestic systems of tax neutral reorganisations74. The Merger Directive also aims to 
protect the financial interests of the Member States and sets out to protect the taxing 
rights through the requirement for a permanent establishment to remain (Art.4 Merger 
Directive)75.  
 
Loss transfers are stipulated in Art. 6 Merger Directive. The rules only apply if the 
member state has domestic rules providing loss transfer for unutilized losses 
connected to the transferring branches/activities to the receiving company76. The loss 
offset rules of the receiving company’s country are not covered in the Merger 
Directive. This light touch, together with requirement of Art.4, results in the loss 
                                                 
 
70
 See Lang, Pistone, Schuch, Staringer p.24. 
 
71
 See Preamble (2) and (3) of the Merger Directive. 
 
72
 See Art. 2 (a) Merger Directive, also Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer p.136. 
 
73
 As of August 2013, 28 states have joined the EU, for up to date information see http://europa.eu/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/. 
 
74
 Basically this is achieved by granting a roll-over of the balance sheet values under Art.4 Merger Directive. Also 
Helminen (2011) at p.172 gives a good overview of the Merger Directive and its goals. 
 
75
 See Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer p.140 regarding this requirement seen as ‘claim saver’ for the future realization 
of any capital gains and the continued right of the member state to tax such gain. The usefulness of this requirement and the 
ECJ’s discussion on exit taxes are outside the scope of this paper. 
 
76
 Note discussion in Helminen (2011), p.173 “In conclusion, the Merger Directive requires the deferral of capital 
gains taxation if a permanent establishment is left in the state of residence of the merging company. The Merger Directive, 
however, does not require the state of residence of the receiving company to deduct losses of the merging company even if a 
permanent establishment would be left in the state of residence of the merging company. It then depends on the basic freedoms of 
the TFEU to what extent the state of residence of the receiving company is required to allow a deduction for the losses of the 
merging company.” 
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transfer rule being considered only a non-discriminatory rule, which is not often 
triggered on its own, and hence rendering it, in the eyes of some academics, 
obsolete.77  
 
Anti-abuse provisions are included in the Merger Directive in Art.15 (1) (a)78 and 
allow the Member States to withdraw the benefits of the Directive where tax evasion 
or abuse is present.  
As no definition of tax evasion or avoidance is given in the text of the Directive, 
Member States when implementing the Directive into national law are able to 
translate these concepts as they see fit. The ECJ had to consider a number of cases on 
the interpretation of Art. 15 (1) (a) Merger Directive79.  
 
4.3 The Procedure  
Where national rules do not comply with the TFEU, the view of the ECJ can be 
sought80 by a national court or a Member State or indeed referred by the Commission 
                                                 
 
77See Lang/Pistone/Schuch/Staringer p.142. 
 
78
 Art. 15 Merger Directive: “1. A Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw the benefit of all or any part of the 
provisions of Articles 4 to 14 where it appears that one of the operations referred to in Article 1: 
 (a) Has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance; the fact that the 
operation is not carried out for valid commercial reasons such as the restructuring or rationalization of the activities of the 
companies participating in the operation may constitute a presumption that the operation has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its 
principal objective or as one of its principal objectives.”  
 
79
 See Leur–Bloem (C-28/95) and Kofoed (C-321/05). In Zwijnenburg (C-352/08) the ECJ clarified that only taxes to 
which the benefit of the Merger Directive relate are considered when looking at the motivation of a transaction and tax 
avoidance. 
 
80
 Under the preliminary ruling procedure, a national court requests a ruling on an actual case to clarify the 
interpretation of the TFEU, whereas in an infringement procedure, a community institution or a member state bring proceedings 
against another Member State. Member State rights in Art. 265 TFEU. Commission rights in Art. 258 TFEU see Avoir Fiscal 
(C270/83) for an example where the Commission investigated member state rules. Art. 267 TFEU, for the entitlement and the 
requirement for submission by national court, also Lutz GmbH and Others (C-182/00) para. 13 for more insight. Requests for 
preliminary rulings are subject to the ‘Acte Clair’ Doctrine, under which question should not be asked if the interpretation is 
unambiguous, see CILFIT (C-283-81) para. 21“unless it has established that [...] the community provision in question has 
already been interpreted by the court so that the correct application of Community Law is so obvious as to leave no scope for 
any reasonable doubt”. 
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itself as a proxy for direct harmonization81. The taxpayer has no right to refer to the 
ECJ directly. In analyzing any case, the ECJ will firstly identify which of the four 
‘fundamental freedoms’ is at stake and then proceed to test whether there was 
discrimination 82  on grounds of nationality or a restriction 83 . Before reaching a 
conclusion, the ECJ needs to take into account whether the restriction pursues an 
objective compatible with EU law.  Member states have the opportunity to present 
justifications 84  and finally the rules are reviewed for proportionality 85 . If a 
justification is not accepted and rules are not found to be proportional, then they are in 
conflict with EC law. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Direct taxation is neither specifically regulated under EU law nor harmonized across 
Member States. This uncertainty combined with the requirement for national rules to 
comply with the TFEU creates an area requiring guidance both for the taxpayer as 
well as the domestic legislator. The case law of the ECJ is helping to establish the 
                                                 
 
81
 See Art. 115 TFEU, which provides a proxie for a EU provision for legislative competence in the area of direct 
taxation. “Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the 
approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the internal market.” 
 
82
  Art. 16d TFEU. Both direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality are prohibited. See Schumacker  
(C-279/93) para. 30 for a definition of discrimination. The ECJ states in Imperial Chemical Industries Plc v Cromer (C264/96), 
para. 16, “[…] the legislation at issue limits, or at least discourages, the exercise by British companies of the right to create 
corporate structures in other Member States […]”. 
 
83
 See Dassonville  (C8/74) for development of the definition started in Avoir Fiscal (C270/83), that can be 
paraphrased as “hinders, deters, makes less attractive the exercise of fundamental rights”.  In Dassonville the Court held that 
trading rules that could hinder intra-EC trading contradict the then Art. 28 ECT, Art. 34 TFEU.  Also Futura (C-250/95) and 
Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH (C-157/07). Helminen (2011) discusses the circumstances 
constituting restrictions, p.174, and gives a brilliant overview of the possible justifications, pp.175 et seq. 
 
84
 Treaty Justifications under TFEU are limited to public policy, security and health for the freedom of establishment, 
Art. 52 TFEU, and public policy & security for the free movement of capital, Art. 66 TFEU. See Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78) 
para. 8, Keck and Mithouard (C267 and C-268/91) para. 15. Justifications that have been accepted in case law include a) 
coherence of tax system (in Danner  (C-136/00), also accepted in Bachmann (C-204/90) but has since been mainly rejected by 
the ECJ), b) prevention of tax avoidance (in Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04)), c) balancing allocation of taxing rights (in Marks 
& Spencer) and d) ensuring effective fiscal supervision (in Marks & Spencer).  Discussion in O’Shea 2006 pp.70-81.  Economic 
reasons including protection of tax revenues have not been accepted by the ECJ, see Vestergaard (C-55/98), also Gammie p.23. 
The so called ‘rule of reason’ or ‘Gebhard formula’ requires national rules to be a) non-discriminatory, b) meet the public interest 
requirement in its legitimate ECT-compatible objectives, c) be appropriate for meeting the objective and d) are proportional and 
do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the stated objectives, i.e. no less-restrictive means could be utilized to protect the 
public interest. See also O’Shea 2006 p.69 et seq. and Kofler p.27 et seq. 
 
85
 Gebhard (C-55/94) para. 37, see Futura for ECJ finding national rule disproportionate. Also O’Shea 2006 p.81 on 
Marks & Spencer. 
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boundaries of domestic rules to ensure they remain within what is required to ensure 
the functioning of the internal market. This allows companies to remain competitive 
and adapt to the requirements of the common market.  The ability of the Court to 
provide general guidance in specific circumstance is very important. This is further 
illustrated by certain cases becoming landmark decisions that are referred backwards 
and forwards by the national courts to extract the most precise answer possible. 
 
5 ECJ CASE LAW ON LOSS UTILISATION 
To understand the effect of EU rules on national merger laws, relevant EU case law 
needs to be considered to see how the ECJ applies the rules of the TFEU and the 
Merger Directive. 
 
5.1 ECJ cases on cross border loss utilization in group mergers 
The ECJ’s view on cross border losses has evolved from its 2005 landmark decision 
in Marks &Spencer (C-446/03)86 when it held that cross-border group relief should be 
possible under certain - very specific – conditions in cases of liquidating foreign 
subsidiaries. Subsequent cases have shed additional light on the system national 
legislators and court should act within. In no other cases until A Oy (C-123/11) has 
the ECJ accepted cross border loss consolidation in its judgement. 
 
                                                 
 
86
 This case had been decided in the UK Courts on 17 December 2002 (Marks and Spencer plc v Halsey [2003] STC 
(SCD 70), was appealed to Park J, referred without judgement to the ECJ where it became case C-446/03. On its return to the 
UK court, Park J provided his view on the ECJ judgement 2006 ([2006] STC 1235). Again this was appealed and cross-appealed 
to the Court of Appeal, its judgement obtained in 2007 ([2008] STC 526) and returned to First Tribunal under John F. Avery 
Jones and Macolm Gammie in February 2009 ([2009] UKFTT 64 (TC)) to find the facts in accordance with the Order of Park J 
as varied by the Court of Appeal. The First-tier Tribunal substantially confirmed the claims by Marks & Spencer for EU group 
relief claim to be valid. 
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5.1.1 Marks & Spencer  
5.1.1.1 The facts of the case 
Marks & Spencer plc., the parent company of the Mark & Spencer group and itself 
resident in the UK, had a number of non-resident subsidiaries across the EU. 
Following several years of unsuccessful trading, it decided in March 2001 to 
terminate loss-making activities and liquidate its subsidiaries in Germany and 
Belgium.  As these subsidiaries were not resident in the UK and did not maintain a 
permanent establishment in the UK, they were not in scope for the UK group relief 
rules. The UK national provision for its group relief system was only available to UK 
resident companies or UK permanent establishments of non-resident companies. 
Between 2000 and 2008, Mark & Spencer applied for group tax relief for losses 
incurred by its non-resident subsidiaries in line with what would have been granted 
for resident entities87. After being refused such relief by the Revenue (“HMRC”), 
Marks & Spencer argued that by denying its subsidiaries in EU member state the right 
to surrender trading losses, the UK rules infringed its freedom of establishment88.  
5.1.1.2 The ECJ judgment  
The ECJ found that the right of freedom of establishment also requires the Member 
State of Origin to not hinder the establishment in another Member State89 . “The 
exclusion of such an advantage in respect of the losses incurred by a subsidiary 
established in another Member State which does not conduct any trading activities in 
the parent company’s Member State is of such a kind as to hinder the exercise by that 
parent company of its freedom of establishment by deterring it from setting up 
                                                 
 
87
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 24. The amounts were substantial, with the losses in the German and 
Belgian entities – at the time- amounting to £99m, or a £30m reduction in tax. 
 
88
 Under Arts. 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
 
89
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 31. 
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subsidiaries in other Member States.” 90  UK Group relief rules were limited to 
companies resident in the UK and hence made it less attractive to establish 
subsidiaries outside of the UK, an exit restriction for UK resident companies entailing 
unfavourable treatment for companies setting up subsidiaries abroad91. 
 
The UK submitted a number of justifications for its restrictive national rules92. The 
ECJ’s analysis of the justifications in its judgement extends the justification of the 
coherence of the tax system established in Bachmann (C-204/90). AG Maduro in his 
opinion on Marks & Spencer emphasizes the protection of the integrity of national 
rules, only for so long though as they do not create an impediment to the integration 
to the internal market 93 . The ECJ did, for the first time, accept a threefold 
justification94 put forward by UK - the prevention of double counting of losses95 and 
tax avoidance96 was accepted ‘taken together’ with the preservation of the taxing 
powers as justification. The decision in Marks & Spencer introduces the argument of 
‘preserving the balanced allocation of taxing powers between Member States’ to the 
ECJ vocabulary. This was the first time that the Court accepted that the aggregate of 
these justifications weights more than the sum of its parts and found the restriction to 
be justified. 
However, all national rules need to be proportional and any restriction should not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve a desired outcome.  The ECJ regarded the UK’s 
                                                 
 
90
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 33. 
 
91
 See AG Maduro in Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 53. 
 
92
 See Mark & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 42 et seq. 
 
93
 See AG Maduro in his opnion on See Mark & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 66. 
 
94
 The concept of territoriality was rejected by the Court in Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 40. The loss of tax 
revenue was not accepted as overriding public interest justification (para. 44), the preservation of taxing power power however 
was (para. 45).  
 
95
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at paras. 47-48. 
 
96
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 49. 
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domestic rules to go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued97 with 
regards to final losses only. The Court provides a first set of criteria98 what final 
losses are; losses are thus exhausted where the following cumulative requirements are 
met99: 
- the possibilities for foreign loss set off have been exhausted, including carry back 
to previous periods  
- no further utilization can be expected in the foreign jurisdiction at any point in the 
future, either by the subsidiary or a third party, 
Where these conditions are met, the ECJ ruled that the freedom of establishment 
prevails over any potential justifications and the state of origin must allow the 
deduction of final losses for non-resident subsidiaries where it has comparable rules 
for resident entities.  
 
5.1.1.3 The Marks & Spencer legacy - The final losses doctrine 
The landmark decision in Marks & Spencer has for the first time given guidance to 
Member States as to what extent non-resident losses may impact the domestic result 
for taxes. Numerous countries commented in the judgment and were very concerned 
by the potential requirement to amend their legislation and accept potential reduced 
tax revenues. The ECJ’s judgement has clarified that in general Member States are 
not required to take non-resident losses into account unless there are final and 
comparable rules allow resident losses to be taken into account. This ‘final losses’ 
doctrine results then in an obligation for Member States to take into consideration 
                                                 
 
97
 The principle of proportionality, see Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 35, the conclusion that the UK group 
relief rules are not proportionate are in para. 55 of the judgement. 
 
98
 In its X Holdings judgement, the ECJ has evoked increased doubt as to whether even final losses need to be 
considered. See AG Kokott’s Opinion on A Oy (C-123/11), para. 47-54. 
 
99
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at paras. 55-56. The ‘no possibilities test’. 
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losses of foreign subsidiaries, where any possibility for deducting the loss in the host 
state has been exhausted and no potential future use by the foreign subsidiary appears 
possible.   
 
The debate remains open as to the difference between a factual impossibility and a 
judicial impossibility. The difference between factual and legal impossibility could be 
where technically the tax rules allow a future offset however no entities remain in the 
jurisdiction or the one remaining are themselves This continues to be discussed in the 
national courts100. The assessment whether losses are final is ultimately a question for 
the national courts to decide. The ECJ has explicitly stated the Member States right to 
introduce specific anti-abuse provisions targeted at avoiding the national rules101 . 
Already, the ECJ’s decision has resulted in a significant change to the UK rules. Also, 
the decision has been seminal for subsequent case law102 and remains one of the most 
prominent judgements of the ECJ in the area of direct taxation.  
 
5.1.2 A Oy 
The ECJ decided for the taxpayer in in A Oy (C-123/11) and examined cross border 
relief of final losses in a group merger with a foreign subsidiary. As the Merger 
Directive is silent on “the question to which extent the state of residence of the 
receiving company must allow a deduction of the losses of a merging company in an 
                                                 
 
100
 See decision of 16 June 2011 (6-K-445/09) of the Lower Court of Niedersachsen, requiring a factual impossibility 
in determining the final nature of losses. The focus in UK jurisprudence has been on the legal possibility of using the losses not 
on the factual possibility. See Bologne/Slavnic at p.7 “In the authors’ view, it follows from Krankenheim Wannsee that M/S P 
[Member State of Parent, addition by author] should only be obliged to allow for a deduction of the losses incurred in M/S S 
[Member State of Subsidiary, addition by author] if these losses also qualify as “final losses” according to the tax rules of M/S 
P.” 
 
101
 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03) at para. 57. 
 
102
 Oy AA (C-231/05) and X Holdings (C-331/08) are cases dealing with on-going losses of foreign subsidiaries. 
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intra-EU cross-border merger.”103 , the ECJ’s decision in A Oy has been ground 
breaking in its potential requirement for Member States to adapt its taxation laws and 
apply the Marks & Spencer “final losses” doctrine in a merger scenario. 
5.1.2.1 The facts of the case 
On March 7th 2011, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland referred case KHO 
2011/547 (21) to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The case concerns an appeal from a 
Finnish parent company limited by shares, A Oy, regarding a binding advance ruling 
of the Central Tax Board of Finland (‘Keskusverolautakuna’ (KVL)) regarding the 
upstream merger of B Ab, a Swedish subsidiary of A Oy. The national Finnish rules 
provided for the right of the acquiring company in a domestic merger to deduct losses 
if it owned more than 50% in the subsidiary at the beginning of the year in which the 
losses were incurred. Under Finnish rules (the Finnish Act on Business Taxation 
(Elinkeinoverolaki), “EVL”, and the Finnish Income Tax Act (Tuloverolaki), “TVL”), 
losses could only be deducted in Finland, if they were determined in accordance with 
the EVL, the losses of B Abs however had been calculated in line with the Swedish 
tax rules and amounted to 44.8m SEK (approx. 5.2m EUR) from the years 2001-7. As 
the loss was not based on EVL and TVL, it was not taken into account for the Finnish 
tax calculation. There was no indication that the merger was solely motivated by 
tax104. 
5.1.2.2 The ECJ judgment 
The ECJ held in favour of the taxpayer and confirmed that the Marks & Spencer 
doctrine of “final losses” can be invoked to offset losses of a non-resident transferring 
                                                 
 
103
 See Helminen 2011, p.172. 
 
104
 See A Oy (C-123/11), para. 17. 
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company in a merger. The national rules stipulated a loss transfer for the receiving 
company105 in a domestic merger but not for a cross border merger, the freedom of 
establishment was invoked and a restriction found. The losses were considered to be 
‘final’ as the only other group companies in Sweden were themselves loss making106. 
No possibility of loss set-off was to be expected107 and no indication of tax avoidance 
was given.  
 
AG Kokott found that the restriction could be justified by the balanced allocation of 
taxing powers108 and found the Finnish rules ‘reasonable proportionate’109. The ECJ 
disagreed and found the restriction not justified. As a result, the Finnish parent 
company (A Oy) could deduct the unutilized pre-existing operating losses in Sweden 
through an upstream merger of its fully owned Swedish subsidiary (B Ab).110 The 
Merger Directive was deemed not to be applicable by both the Advocate General 
Kokott 111  and the ECJ 112  as no permanent establishment of A Oy remained in 
Sweden113, the judgement confirmed that the freedom of establishment can go further 
                                                 
 
105
 See A Oy (C-123/11), para. 30. See X Holdings (C337/08), para. 17 for the applicability of the freedom of 
establishment also to companies, “Freedom of establishment, which Article 43 EC grants to Community nationals and which 
includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, under the 
same conditions as those laid down for its own nationals by the law of the Member State in which such establishment is effected, 
entails, in accordance with Article 48 EC, for companies formed pursuant to the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the European Community, the right to exercise 
their activity in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency (see, inter alia, Case C-307/97 Saint 
Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I6161, paragraph 35, and Marks & Spencer, paragraph 30)”  
 
106
 See A Oy (C-123/11), para. 11. 
 
107
 No signs of using losses twice were obvious, see A Oy (C-123/11), para. 44. 
 
108
 See AG Kokott’s Opinion on A Oy (C-123/11), para. 54. 
 
109
 See AG Kokott’s Opinion on A Oy (C-123/11), para. 68. 
 
110
 See A Oy (C-123/11), para. 9. 
 
111
 In her opinion as published on 19/07/2012, see 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=125201&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&cid
=83515  on 11.8.2013. 
 
112
 See judgement at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=134107&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=firs
t&part=1&cid=5684992 on 10.8.2013 
 
113
 The remaining group companies, Y AB and Z AB, were subsidiaries of another group company, X Oy and not 
directly owned by A Oy. See Art.4 & 6 Merger Directive and A Oy (C-123/11), para. 10. 
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than the Directive. With respect to the rules for determining the amount of the tax 
reduction, the ECJ has given limited guidance in A Oy, as it stipulates that the 
calculation should reflect equal treatment compared to that of the equivalent entity in 
a domestic situation, the resident subsidiary114, which indicated that the rules of the 
origin state where the receiving entity is resident should be applied. This judgement 
will require national courts to determine the relevant losses on a case-by-case basis. 
5.1.2.3 A Oy - The impact on future case law 
The ECJ judgement in A Oy provides useful clarity for Member States as to their 
requirement to align merger loss utilisation rules for domestic and cross-border 
mergers. It also clarifies that Member States need to provide loss utilization rules for 
one-off losses stemming from mergers not only from liquidations and potentially 
similar circumstances. From its deliberations, it becomes evident that where internal 
mergers benefit from loss relief, cross-border mergers in a comparable situation need 
to have access to the same rules. Many questions though remain open - whether losses 
that only exist under the rules of the host state and are due to timing differences need 
to be taken into account into the state of origin, or whether the amount of the losses 
should be only be determined under the rules of the origin state. These questions are 
relevant as in the frequently used words of the ECJ: ”freedom of establishment cannot 
[…] be understood as meaning that a Member State is required to draw up its tax 
rules on the basis of those in another Member State in order to ensure, in all 
circumstances, taxation which removes any disparities arising from national tax 
rules.” 115  Further ECJ cases are to be expected and will hopefully provide for 
continuing clarification, maybe already in the pending K case (C-322/11). 
                                                 
 
114
 See A Oy (C-123/11), para. 59. 
 
115
 Bologne/Slavnic citing Deutsche Shell (C-293/06) at p.6. 
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5.2 ECJ on Tax Avoidance for loss utilization in mergers 
5.2.1 Foggia 
The ECJ delivered its judgment in the preliminary ruling request by the Portuguese 
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (the court of final instance) in the Foggia (C-
126/11) case. Before even answering the questions referred, it had to establish its 
competence to answer; the Portuguese Government had questioned the ECJ’s remit, 
as the circumstances were purely internal116. The ECJ ruled that it had jurisdiction as 
the tax rules for mergers applied both domestically as well as cross-border. In 
particular where a term (“valid commercial reasons”), initially used in this context in 
the Merger Directive, was used in national legislation, the ECJ found it important to 
ensure a consistent interpretation. 
5.2.1.1 The facts of the case 
In 2003 Foggia, a Portuguese resident taxpayer and member of a corporate group, 
merged with three of its group companies in a merger by acquisition. The transferring 
entities, three holding companies, were also Portuguese resident. Portuguese tax law 
allows in a merger for the tax losses of the transferring entity to be offset against the 
taxable profits of the receiving entity as long as such merger was entered into for 
“valid commercial reasons” 117 . In order to deduct the unutilized losses of the 
transferring entities and in line with the domestic legislation, Foggia applied to the 
Ministry of Finance to set off losses by the three transferring companies incurred 
                                                 
 
116
 See Foggia (C-126/11) at para. 16 et seq. 
 
117
 See Portuguese Corporation Tax Code (Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Colectivas, the 
“CIRC”), Art. 68-60 at Foggia (C-126/11) at paras. 6-7. Such restriction is in line with the requirements of the Merger Directive 
as the same conditions re put upon domestic and cross border transactions. 
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between 1997 and 2002. The taxpayer argued that the benefits from the group 
restructuring were mainly derived from administrative and management cost savings.  
 
Such application was denied for one of the companies (Riguadiana – SGPS SA, 
“Riguadiana”)118 as no commercial interest was identified and abuse was suspected. 
The local authorities suspected abuse as Riguadiana did not effectively carry out any 
activities or generated any taxable income, but had invested in securities and no clear 
provenance of its tax losses could be provided 119 . In its refusal, the authorities 
explicitly stated that the reduction of administrative costs alone does not provide a 
sufficient commercial rationale for a merger. 
5.2.1.2 The ECJ judgment  
In the judgement on Foggia (C-126/10), the ECJ clarified that EU law would apply, 
in accordance with settled EU case law where a domestic legislator employs an EU 
law concept in internal law, such concepts should be interpreted uniformly by the 
ECJ.  
When discussing the questions referred by the national courts, the ECJ follows its 
previous case law on “valid commercial rationale”120 and gives further insight into its 
thinking on the then Art.11 (now Art.15) Merger Directive. Where tax avoidance is 
one of the main objectives, Member States are able to withhold the benefits of the 
Merger Directive121.  
                                                 
 
118
 See Foggia (C-126/11) at para. 10. The request was approved for the other two companies. 
 
119
 See Foggia (C-126/11) at para. 11. 
 
120
 The ECJ describes tax avoidance in Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04) as ‘wholly artificial arrangements’. See 
Zwijnenburg (C-352/08), also see Ionna Mitroyanni (2007), p.77 “The scope of the anti-abuse provision of the EC Merger 
Directive 212 has been interpreted in Leur-Bloem. The Court gave a strict literal interpretation of the anti-abuse clause. It ruled 
that, if the operation was not carried out for 'valid commercial reasons', there is a presumption of tax evasion or avoidance.“ 
Leur-Bloem (C-28/95)). 
 
121
 See Foggia (C-126/11) at paras. 3-5. 
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The ECJ recognises that tax considerations might be one of the considerations in a 
group restructuring decisions, however clarifies that it should not be predominant.122 
Further, a positive effect from a merger on administrative and management cost is to 
be expected in a group simplification but in this case are too marginal to outweigh the 
tax advantage as the main driver. In particular, the absence of any commercial 
activities like actual holding activities rather than just investment in securities, 
combined with a relatively large tax loss of EUR 2m of undefined pedigree, let the 
ECJ conclude that the transaction had not been entered into for ‘valid commercial 
reasons’123 and “the form of the transaction was that of a merger, but the merger was 
not the real purpose of it, rather, the tax losses were”124.  
After answering these questions, the ECJ referred back to the national courts’ remit to 
decide whether a particular group restructuring intends to avoid tax as no 
predetermines criteria can be relied upon.125  
 
5.3 Resulting trends in ECJ case law 
The criteria for final loss utilization have been set very tightly and will limit the area 
of application to a specific set of circumstances as final losses can be considered one-
off occurrences in contract to general rules for loss utilization. Where those specific 
circumstances apply, Member States will have to review their tax rules carefully. The 
ECJ’s decisions on the freedom of establishment have significantly influenced the 
                                                 
 
122
 See Foggia (C-126/11) at para 35. 
 
123
 This has been developed already in a number of cases following Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04) and Halifax (C-
255/02), i.e. in Leur-Bloem (C-28/95) and Zwijnenburg (C-352/08). 
 
124
 See Jimenez, p.11. 
 
125
 See Foggia (C-126/11) at para. 37. 
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UK’s rules on group and consortium relief and resulted in amendments to “permit a 
non-UK-resident company in certain circumstances to surrender losses and other 
amounts by way of group relief that are not attributable to a permanent establishment 
it has in the UK.”126 The Austrian rules on loss carry over in merger situations require 
not only transfer at historic cost (i.e. following the rules the transferring entity was 
subject to) but also the assets and liabilities that incurred the losses to be present in 
the receiving entity, in cross border situations, this might be rather difficult and might 
either require further ECJ guidance or an adjustment of national rules. 
 
The UK’s introduction of a GAAR with the related overriding statutory limit as to 
what extent taxpayers can reduce their tax liabilities, mirrors the focus of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence and its focus on “valid commercial rationale”. As Foggia shows, the 
ECJ’s judgement lead to a more uniform interpretation of common concepts and 
might help to harmonize at least the small areas of direct taxation. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
From the review in this paper, it can be concluded that all of the three jurisdictions 
allow some sort of tax neutral transfer. The analysis found a wide spectrum ranging 
from full domestic and EU group consolidation in Austria, a fiscal unity regime in 
Luxembourg and a system of group loss transfer rules in the UK. Specific merger 
taxation legislation exists in Austria and Luxembourg, whereas the UK has more 
specific rules depending on the kind of income and the transaction chosen. 
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 See Bramwell et al. at T5.1.1. 
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When reviewing the limited but very significant case law for intragroup mergers and 
loss transfers, it becomes clear very quickly how relevant these decisions are for 
national rules. Taking into account the main developments in EU case law to 
understand the “final losses doctrine” and the ECJ’s emphasis on “valid commercial 
reasons”, it can be demonstrated that there is a trend towards harmonization in the 
area of direct tax. One could put to the ECJ that any member state not wanting to be 
challenged for cross border merger issues, would best not have any rules for internal 
mergers. In such a scenario, where no permanent establishment remains and the 
Merger Directive does not apply, no requirement can be established under the 
freedom of establishment. Such a stance however would serve neither the internal 
market nor the domestic circumstances.  
The underlying principles of the TFEU and the increasing connectivity of corporate 
groups across Europe, will also further fuel an on-going need for balancing the 
sovereignty of the Member States and the need for further harmonisation across the 
Union. For the time Member States will maintain their right to determine the laws for 
direct taxation in their territory and will have to find a way to do so that is compatible 
with EU law as well as ensuring they remain an attractive location for corporates to 
locate their headquarters. 
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